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THE SEESAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POWER FROM EPA TO





A MONG the multitude of pressing issues facing the United
Z tates, one issue in particular has dominated political debates
over the past few years. While some have argued for a centralized
nation whose power lies primarily in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment and Congress, others have supported a decentralized
country with political power distributed among the states.' Deter-
mining the appropriate balance of power has significant effects on
the relationship between the federal government and the states
with regard to the enforcement of environmental law. Attempts to
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1. In 1995, a New York Times columnist wrote:
In a hectic, clamorous year such as this one, it is remarkable to find one
issue common to so many debates. But such a theme leaps from the rec-
ord of 1995, and it is as old as the Republic: the nature of American
federalism. Are we to have a centralized government, or a decentralized
one? The question has a corollary: is the central government too big?
R.W. Apple, Jr., Washington, 1995: Echoes of a 200-Year Debate, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 24,
1995, § 4, at 1.
1
Martin and Kern: The Seesaw of Environmental Power from EPA to the States: Nationa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
2 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JoURNAL
shift power between the federal government and state governments
have given rise to a number of key concerns. First, current environ-
mental devolution lacks due process. 2 Second, the federal govern-
ment does not accommodate requisite shifts in responsibility to the
states with adequate federal oversight, and, as a result, a reduction
in environmental protection and quality has surfaced. In response
to these concerns, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
established the National Environmental Performance Partnership
System (NEPPS),3 a program that will fundamentally alter the rela-
tionship between the states and the federal government in the regu-
lation of pollution. 4
Under NEPPS, EPA and the states sign contracts setting envi-
ronmental priorities and shifting responsibility for these priorities
from the federal government to the states. 5 NEPPS encourages
2. See George Cameron Coggins, "Devolution" in Federal Land Law: Abdication by
Any Other Name, 3 HASTINGS W. - N.W.J. ENVrL. L. & POL'y 211, 211 (1996). "Devo-
lution" is the term used to describe the delegation of power from the federal gov-
ernment to state and local governments. See id. Environmental devolution is, as
the name indicates, the title given to devolution from the federal government to
states with regard to environmental regulation and protection. See id. For a discus-
sion of the general trend toward devolution, see infra notes 23-43 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of environmental devolution, see infra notes 86-94 and
accompanying text.
3. See Performance Partnership Grants for State and Tribal Environmental
Programs: Revised Interim Guidance, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,887 (1996) [hereinafter Re-
vised Guidance on Performance Partnership Grants]; see also ENIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY (EPA), Performance Partnership Grants for State and Tribal
Environmental Programs: Interim Guidance (Dec. 1995) (on file with author) [herein-
after Performance Partnership Grants]. Key goals of NEPPS are "to allow States and
EPA to achieve improved environmental results by directing scarce public re-
sources toward the highest priority, highest value activities; to provide States with
greater flexibility to achieve those results; and to enhance accountability to the
public and taxpayers." Revised Guidance on Performance Partnership Grants,
supra, at 42,890.
4. See Revised Guidance on Performance Partnership Grants, supra note 3, at
42,888; see also Letter from Fred Hanson, EPA Deputy Administrator, to Senior
State Environmental Protection Officials 1 (July 15, 1996) (on file with author)
(stating that "[t]he goal of [NEPPS] is to strengthen protection of public health
and the environment by directing scarce public resources toward the most press-
ing environmental needs, providing states with more flexibility in how they achieve
environmental results, and enhancing accountability") (hereinafter Letter from
Fred Hanson]. For a further discussion of NEPPS and its accompanying problems,
see infra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
5. See U.S. EPA, Joint Commitment to Reform Oversight and Create a National Envi-
ronmental Performance Partnership System (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://
www.epa.gov/regional/Oversight/oversite.html> [hereinafter Creation of Partner-
ship System]. EPA Administrator Carol Browner and state environmental agency
heads formed NEPPS in an effort to increase the role of states in assessing their
environmental programs, while decreasing EPA's role in overseeing state pro-
grams. See Merry Goodenough, Public Participation in a State-Assumed Wetlands Per-
mit Program: The Michigan Example, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LIrIG. 221, 296 (1995).
[Vol. IX: p. I
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states to develop individual assessments of their environmental
goals and to negotiate "contracts for services" with EPA.6 Congres-
sional involvement in the NEPPS devolution processes has been,
thus far, limited to appropriating necessary funds via the massive
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996.7 Twenty-five states have
signed NEPPS contracts for fiscal year 1998.8 Although the intent
to provide increased flexibility and to transfer power to the states is
a positive development, the effectiveness of NEPPS may be frus-
trated by the carefully developed statutory and regulatory require-
ments which define the relationship between EPA and the states in
the field of environmental protection. 9
This Article analyzes NEPPS from a variety of perspectives, in-
cluding public choice theory, by applying an economist's regulatory
methodology to current public law.10 Section II of this Article dis-
6. See Creation of Partnership System, supra note 5, at 5; see also Goodenough,
supra note 5, at 296. The pertinent statutory language reads as follows: "The Ad-
ministrator is authorized to make grants to any state, municipality, or in-
termunicipal or interstate agency for the construction of publically owned
treatment works.... [G]rants made under this subsection shall be made only to
projects for secondary treatment, or any cost effective alternative thereto." Clean
Water Act § 201(g) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (1) (1994). There are, however, limits
on the Administrator's power to make these grants. See id. §§ 201 (g) (2)-(3), (5)-
(6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281 (g) (2)-(3), (5)-(6).
7. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
8. See NEPPS Notes - February 1998, Summary of Developing Performance Partnership
Agreements Under AEPPS (visited March 4, 1998) <http://www.sso.org/ecos/
nepps.htm> [herinafter NEPPS Notes]; see also EPA, Twenty States in Performance Part-
nerships, Others Expected to Participate in Program, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1907 (Jan. 17,
1997).
9. For a discussion of NEPPS and its accompanying problems, see infra notes
95-132 and accompanying text.
10. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Symposium Forward: Positive Polit-
ical Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 457-67 (1992). "Public choice" is de-
fined as "the application of the economist's methods to the political scientist's
subject." Id. at 458. Public choice has also been referred to as "the economic study
of nonmarket decision making." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989).
Public choice involves the study of how legislation, which is the heart of public law,
affects public policy decisions. See Farber & Frickey, supra, at 461.
Scholars argue that the legislature represents the public interest. See id. at
459-62. However, statutes may reflect private interests, due to undue influence of
special interest groups. See id. It is also arguable that a statute may not be repre-
sentative of any identifiable public interest because the public itself is too frag-
mented to generate any one public policy. See id. at 459-60.
Public choice scholars have attempted to analyze public decision-making
based on interest group in-fighting. See id. at 460. Under certain conditions,
groups attempting to choose among three or more alternatives by majority vote
may be unable to reach a consistent decision. This analysis is difficult at best for
NEPPS because Congress, state legislatures, interest groups and ordinary citizens
are seemingly absent from the process. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's
1998]
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cusses federalism and the current trend to devolve central responsi-
bility and authority from the federal government to the states.
Section II also sets forth the background and current status of envi-
ronmental protection and policy in the United States. 1 Next, Sec-
tion III discusses the current trends in environmental regulation. 12
Finally, after an analysis of NEPPS and the potential problems
NEPPS poses in Section IV, 13 the Article concludes in Section V by
suggesting that the judiciary may be in the best position to impact
the pace and procedures of the implementation of NEPPS.14
II. LAYING THE HIsTORicAL FRAMEWORK
A. Federalism
Federalism is a concept that has expanded and contracted with
the political winds of our nation's history. Defining the bounds of
federalism begins and ends with an examination of the federal gov-
ernment's relationship with the states. While some theorists believe
that a nation requires a strong centralized government, others sug-
gest that the federal government should vest a majority of its power
within the individual states. 15 This age-old debate continues into
the context of environmental devolution.
The Tenth Amendment 16 of the Constitution provides the ral-
lying cry for champions of states' rights and limited government.
Supporters of states' rights insist that a government closest to the
people is best because the people are aware of and can control such
a government.' 7 The nation, however, initially espoused a weak
End, 43J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 32 (1993); see generally Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of
Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV.
353 (1994).
11. For a discussion of federalism and devolution, see infra notes 15-43 and
accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of current trends in environmental regulation, see infra
notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of NEPPS and the problems it poses, see infra notes 95-
132 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the authors' view that the judiciary may be in the best
position to impact the pace and procedures of the implementation of NEPPS, see
infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
15. See Irwin Chemerinsky, Rehabilitating Federalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1333,
1333-34 (1994) (reviewing SAMUEL H. BEEV, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY
OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993)).
16. U.S. CONST. amend X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he Pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Id.
17. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REv. 461, 491-92 (1995) ("State governments represent the 'real' govern-
ments of the people. The federal government exists as a somewhat mistrusted
[Vol. IX: p. 1
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central government coupled with state supremacy and found such a
system unworkable. Specifically, the leaders of the individual states
deemed the Articles of Confederation, America's first attempt at
self-government, a failure. 18 Although the Articles of Confedera-
tion afforded great independence and self-determination to the
states, the political structure proved too loose and, ultimately,
ineffectual.19
In an attempt to balance competing considerations and to con-
trol potential conflicts through a system of checks and balances, the
founders settled on and ratified the Constitution.20 Under the
Constitution, the division of power between the federal government
agent of the states, with states retaining the power to protect their people (and
themselves) by checking the actions of the federal government where necessary to
prevent overreaching."). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
states' Tenth Amendment rights in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For
a discussion of Lopez, see infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
18. See ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 12747 (1935).
19. See id. at 155.
20. See id. at 147-97. In Carter v. Carter, the Court noted the following:
Those who framed and those who adopted [the Constitution] meant to
carve from the general mass of legislative powers, then possessed by the
states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer upon the fed-
eral government; and in order that there should be no uncertainty in
respect of what was taken and what was left, the national powers of legisla-
tion were not aggregated but enumerated - with the result that what was
not embraced by the enumeration remained vested in the states without
change or impairment. Thus, "when it was found necessary to establish a
national government for national purposes," this court said... "a part of
the powers of the States and of the people of the States was granted to the
United States and the people of the United States. This grant operated as
a further limitation upon the powers of the States, so that now the gov-
ernments of the States possess all the powers of the Parliament of Eng-
land, except such as have been delegated to the United States or reserved
by the people." While the states are not sovereign in the true sense of
that term, but only quasi-sovereign, yet in respect of all powers reserved
to them they are supreme - "as independent of the general government
as that government within its sphere is independent of the States." And
since every addition to the national legislative power to some extent de-
tracts from or invades the power of the states, it is of vital moment that, in
order to preserve the fixed balance intended by the Constitution, the
powers of the general government be not so extended as to embrace any
not within the express terms of several grants or the implications neces-
sarily to be drawn therefrom. . . . The determination of the Framers'
Convention and the ratifying convention to preserve complete and
unimpaired state self-government in all matters not committed to the
general government is one of the plainest facts which emerge from the
history of their deliberations. And adherence to that determination is
incumbent equally upon the federal government and the states. State
power can neither be appropriated on the one hand nor abdicated on
the other.
298 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1936); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724 (1868).
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and the states is imprecise. 21 Historically, the balance of power has
fluctuated between the federal and state governments, with the fed-
eral government assuming preeminence over the past seventy
years. 22 The most recent trend is a shift of power away from the
federal government toward the states. This may represent a perma-
nent shift or just a minor interruption in the ongoing movement of
centralization. Regardless, before the federal government divests
power to the states for such major programs as welfare, education
and environmental protection, the impact of this devolution should
be analyzed for unintended consequences or irreversible side-
effects.
B. General Trend Toward Devolution
Contemporary debates over federalism represent very different
concepts of how the nation should divide power, resources and re-
sponsibility among the federal government, the state governments
and local public entities. After decades of continually increasing
federal presence on the political forefront, it appears that the states
are gaining strength through devolution.23 An examination of re-
cent developments in politics and Supreme Court decisions further
evidences the rise in the devolution of power from the federal gov-
ernment to the states.
By looking at campaign platforms over the past few years, one
may see the trend toward devolution and the public's acceptance of
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison). James Madison noted that
"[w] hile the powers the Constitution delegates to the federal government are few
and defined, those it delegates to the States are numerous and indefinite." Id.
When faced with criticism of the competing interests inherent in the federal-state
structure, Madison further stated that "the federal and State governments are in
fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different pow-
ers, and designed for different purposes." THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James
Madison).
22. See Apple, supra note 1, § 4, at 1. The following is a brief history of the
division of power between the federal government and state governments since the
Civil War:
During Reconstruction, Washington ruthlessly imposed its will on the de-
feated southern states. Then came a period of isolationism and weak cen-
tral government, and then the New Deal, grudgingly and narrowly
permitted by the Supreme Court, which broadened its interpretation of
the commerce clause to allow Washington to respond to the Depression.
That opening allowed succeeding administrations, Republican and Dem-
ocratic, to create a huge Federal apparatus to grapple with the nation's
social ills.
Id.
23. For a discussion about current environmental devolution programs, see
NEPPS Notes, supra note 8. For a definition and explanation of devolution, see
supra note 2.
[Vol. IX: p. 1
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/1
SEESAW OF POWER: NEPPS
this trend. For example, in 1994, the republican party gained con-
trol of the House of Representatives and the Senate by calling for
more state power in the implementation of federal legislation, in-
cluding environmental regulations. 24 Likewise, both 1996 presi-
dential candidates recognized the public's negative attitude toward
"big government" and called for more power to the states.25 Presi-
dent Clinton showed support for a shift in power from the federal
government to the states in August 1995 when, speaking before
Congress, he stated that "[t]he days of made in Washington deci-
sions, dictated by a distant government, are gone. Instead, solu-
tions must be locally crafted, and implemented by entrepreneurial
public entities, private actors and a growing network of community-
based firms and organizations." 26
The Supreme Court reinforced the overall trend toward devo-
lution with its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez.27 For the first
time in forty years, the Court found a federal act to be a violation of
the Commerce Clause. 28 In Lopez, the Court had to determine the
24. See Apple, supra note 1, § 4, at 1. One commentator noted the following:
Newt Gingrich and his band of self-styled Republican revolutionaries
have cast themselves as the champions of states' rights and limited gov-
ernment. Give more responsibilities back to the states and the localities,
they cry; government closest to the people is best, because they can keep
an eye on it.... [Nevertheless i]t is not clear whether the 1994 elections
represent a historic shift toward the Republicans; some poll data suggest
that they have overplayed their hand and may face reversals in the elec-
tions of 1996 and 1998. But there is no doubt at all that the terms of the
political battle have changed. Notice: President Clinton resists Mr. Ging-
rich and his allies in the Senate on what parts of the government will be
downsized, and how, but not on the idea that government is too big.
Id.
25. See Key Issues: The Candidates' Positions, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 1996, at 3E.
One commentator noted:
It is not just the legislative Republicans, exalted by their return to control
of Congress after decades in the wilderness, who conspired to cede or
shift power back to the states in 1995. President Clinton, a former gover-
nor who campaigned in 1992 as a new kind of Democrat who would not
look to the Federal Government to solve every problem, had his own
ideas about how to shrink government.
Apple, supra note 1, § 4, at 1.
26. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the National Urban Policy
Report, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1364 (Aug. 3, 1995). President Clinton cam-
paigned in 1992 as a Washington outsider. In 1996, over his own party's objec-
tions, he signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1995) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.); see generally Brian Sierra, House Passes GOP Welfare
Plan, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 24, 1995.
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. See id. at 551. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
that "[t]he [Gun-Free School Zones] Act neither regulates a commercial activity
nor contains a requirement that the possession [of a gun] be connected in any way
19981
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constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act.29 The Court
held that when viewed in the aggregate, the possession of guns in
school zones failed to "substantially affect interstate commerce"
and, therefore, the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitu-
tional.30 The Lopez standard, whether a given law regulates an activ-
ity which substantially affects interstate commerce, is subjective and
lends itself to a totality of the circumstances analysis. Since Lopez
has been decided, the Court had not yet established a bright-line
test for determining the parameters of Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause or the states' Tenth Amendment powers.31
In the last two years, the Supreme Court has heard several
other cases involving federalism issues. In Printz v. United States,3 2
the Court considered the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act (Brady Handgun Act).3s The Brady Hand-
gun Act required local sheriffs to conduct checks on individuals
to interstate commerce." Id. at 551. Chief justice Rehnquist concluded by
commenting:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm
have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
Id. at 567.
29. See id. at 549. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, which prohibited the pres-
ence of guns within one mile of schools, was challenged as an unconstitutional
extension and application of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. See id. at
551.
30. See id. at 549.
31. See id. One commentator noted the following with respect to the Court's
holding in United States v. Lopez:
The Supreme Court, long an engine of Federal hegemony, began to have
its doubts as well. It ruled that Congress had exceeded its power under
the Constitution's commerce clause by enacting a law prohibiting people
from carrying guns in the vicinity of the schools, and it came within a
single vote of permitting the states to impose limits on the terms of mem-
bers of Congress as a national institution, the essence of Lincoln's "more
perfect union," and not merely, as John C. Calhoun had it, a creature of
the states that created it.
Apple, supra note 1, § 4, at 1.
32. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
33. See id. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act provided:
A chief law enforcement officer to whom a transferor has provided notice
. . . shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days
whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including
research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available
and in a national system designated by the Attorney General .... Any
transferor of a handgun who, after such transfer, receives a report from a
chief law enforcement officer containing information that receipt or pos-
session of the handgun by the transferor violates Federal, State or local
law shall . . . communicate [such] information . . . to the chief law en-
[Vol. IX: p. I
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who applied for handgun permits. The Court found the Brady
Handgun Act to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was un-
duly burdensome on local and state law enforcement authorities.
34
This decision affirmed the Tenth Amendment's grant of sover-
eignty to the states. 35
The Supreme Court continued to hold in favor of state sover-
eignty in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.3 6 In that 1997 deci-
sion, the Court considered the relationship between an Indian
Tribe and the State of Idaho with respect to the ownership of
riverbed property. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe claimed the rights to
the riverbeds of all waterways flowing through its reservation, as well
as the valuable mineral deposits contained beneath them. The
State of Idaho, however, asserted ownership of all navigable water-
ways within state boundaries, including the property claimed by the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe.37 Asserting that state ownership of lands un-
derlying navigable waterways was historically considered an attri-
bute of state sovereignty, the Court held in favor of the State of
Idaho.38
In its recent 1997 decision, Washington v. Glucksberg,39 the
Court examined an individual state's authority to enact a law ban-
ning assisted suicide. 40 The Court held that the State of Washing-
forcement officer of the place of business of the transferor; and the chief
law enforcement officer of the place of residence of the transferee.
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act §§ 102 (s) (2), (s) (4) (A) - (B), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(s) (2), (s) (4) (A) - (B) (1994), held unconstitutional in Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
34. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369-70. For the specific statutory language requir-
ing law enforcement officers to perform background checks, see supra note 33. In
Printz, the Court noted that "[t] he petitioners here object to being pressed into
federal service, and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to
execute federal laws is unconstitutional." Id. at 2369-70.
35. See id. at 2384. The Printz Court stated that "[w]e adhere to that principle
today... [that] '[t] he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.' The mandatory obligation imposed on
[local law enforcement officials] to perform background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul of that rule." Id. at 2383.
36. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
37. See id. at 2031.
38. See id. at 2043. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority noted:
[I]f the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its land and
waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any con-
ceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury.... The dignity and
status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts,
which are open to hear and determine the case.
Id.
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ton's statutory scheme did not violate the Due Process Clause
because the right to assisted suicide was not a fundamental liberty
protected by the Constitution. 41 The Court reasoned that Washing-
ton's statutory ban was valid because it was rationally related to le-
gitimate government interests.42 All three of these Supreme Court
decisions reflect the Court's affirmation of states' rights under the
Tenth Amendment and illustrate the current trend toward recogni-
tion of the states as sovereign decision-making entities.
Anticipating how the Supreme Court will rule on future legisla-
tion, and in particular federal regulations designed to address pol-
lution, may prove more complex than simply looking to these
recent decisions and concluding that the Court will favor devolu-
tion. Although the Court has always interpreted federal regulation
of pollution as resting under the protective cover of the Commerce
Clause, and, therefore, within the purview of the federal govern-
ment, the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez calls into question the
continued appropriateness of the federal government's preeminent
presence in a field which it has dominated since 1970. 4 3
C. Environmental Legislation
National environmental laws and regulations are the product
of tensions between coexisting desires for a unified, national pollu-
tion standard and a preference for local control of land use, gar-
bage disposal and natural resource restrictions more responsive to
41. See id. at 2271. The Court stated that Washington's statute "does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied to competent
terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths . '" Id. at 2275.
42. See id. The Court reasoned as follows:
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to per-
mit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the
asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution
also requires, however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be ration-
ally related to legitimate government interests. This requirement is un-
questionably met here.
Id. at 2271 (citations omitted).
43. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); cf. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). In Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, the Court stated that "we agree with the
lower federal courts that have uniformly found the power conferred by the Com-
merce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities caus-
ing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in
more than one State." Hodel 452 U.S. at 282; see also United States v. Byrd, 609
F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657,
663 (3d Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
[Vol. IX: p. I
10
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/1
SEESAW OF POWER: NEPPS
local needs.44 Although issues of environmental protection were
initially considered local concerns, Congress mandated national en-
vironmental standards in 1970 after most states failed to meet even
the minimum national standards recommended at the federal
level. 45 In response to these shifts in the allocation of responsibility
for environmental protection, several models depicting the interac-
tion between the federal government and the states materialized
and were implemented in various environmental statutes. 46
One model provided for minimal involvement on the part of
the federal government and encouraged states to adopt their own
environmental regulations in light of federal incentives.47 There
were numerous drawbacks to this model, including the lack of au-
thority or final accountability for control of pollution on the part of
both the federal government and the states.48 Moreover, this
model fostered a lack of uniformity of standards and enforcement
procedures across state borders and the nation as a whole. Regula-
tors that followed this model imposed requisite regulations solely at
the state level, or uniformly imposed such regulations but failed to
enforce them.49 It is likely that the use of this model prior to 1970
resulted in little or no improvement in pollution control levels be-
cause it did not grant the federal government the authority to im-
pose its own regulations or enforce those of the states.50
44. See E. Donald Elliot et. al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federal-
ization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 318-20 (1985) (discussing
federal legislation enacted from 1965 to 1970 while environmentalists were not
well-organized).
45. See id. at 335-36; see also Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S.
109, 116 (1972) ("As a matter of law as well as practical necessity, corrective reme-
dies for air pollution, therefore, necessarily-must be considered in the context of
localized situations. We conclude that the causes should be heard in the appropri-
ate federal district courts.").
46. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1173 (1995) (providing general discussion of
environmental federalism, its history and its implications).
47. See id. (noting federal government used regulatory or financial incentives
to encourage states). This model has been described as "consistent with constitu-
tional principles of federalism outlined in New York v. United States, where the
Court expressly approved Congress's use of its spending power to encourage states
to implement federal programs." Id. at 1173-74.
48. See id. at 1174 (positing that "[t]he power of this approach as a tool for
motivating states to act depends in large part on the amount of federal financial
assistance involved").
49. See id. (stating that "[t]he two other models of environmental federalism
feature much more aggressive regulatory roles").
50. See id. at 1173 (noting although "this approach proved to be largely inef-
fective at controlling air and water pollution, it is still the principal federal ap-
proach to issues such as land-use regulation where political sensitivity to federal
regulation is particularly high").
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A second model, represented in a majority of state statutes, is
called "cooperative federalism."51 Under this model, Congress
either made the major policy decisions or assigned them to EPA.52
When Congress delegated policy decisions to EPA, EPA established
national environmental standards which provided a minimum level
of environmental protection or a regulatory floor.55 In turn, state
authorities applied for delegation of the environmental program.
The following are typical steps necessary for a state to have an envi-
ronmental program delegated to it: (1) designation of a lead
agency to receive delegation; (2) enactment of pollution controls
paralleling federal statutes; and (3) completion of a lengthy delega-
tion application.54 Once the program was delegated, the state ad-
ministered it and enforced its provisions against violators. 55
Additionally, EPA dispensed funds and a list of responsibilities to
the state for implementation of the program.56 If a state did not
enforce the standards EPA set, EPA either cut or withdrew the allo-
cated funds, or canceled the delegation and operated the environ-
mental program itself.5 7 The practical necessity of this model was
the inability of the federal government to administer all, or even
some, of the local and state programs. 58 Furthermore, since federal
regulators showed a lack of understanding and sympathy for local
industry problems, it was unlikely that industry would have pre-
ferred regulation at the federal level.59
51. See Percival, supra note 46, at 1174 (describing this model as "predomi-
nant approach to environmental federalism currently employed by federal envi-
ronmental statutes").
52. See id.
53. See id. (stating that "[t]he Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, [the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act], and the Safe Drinking Water Act all re-
quire EPA to establish minimum national standards that can be implemented and
administered by states subject to federal supervision").
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Percival, supra note 46, at 1174.
57. See id. (stating that this concept is "consistent with constitutional princi-
ples of federalism approved by the Supreme Court . . . because it offers states a
choice of regulating an activity 'according to federal standards or having state law
pre-empted by federal regulation'" (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
167 (1992))).
58. See id. (stating that "the federal government cannot implement its air pol-
lution program without substantial resources, expertise, information, and political
support of state and local officials" (citing John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. Rxv. 1183 (1995)).
59. See id. at 1175 (indicating that "state autonomy is preserved because most
federal environmental standards established under this model are minimum
standards").
[Vol. IX: p. I
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/1
SEESAW OF POWER: NEPPS
A third model involved coercive federal control and called for
the preemption of state statutes by federal law. 60 Statutes embody-
ing this model include the Toxic Substances Control Act,6 1 the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act,62 the Clean Air
Act, 6 3 the Coastal Zone Management Act, 6 4 and the Clean Water
Act.
6 5
III. CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
A. Federalism
Under the cooperative federalism model, the federal govern-
ment currently dominates the field of environmental protection
policy. 66 This, however, has not always been the case. The federal
government did not enact any major protection programs until the
1970s, following a long history of states' failures to deal with intra-
state and interstate pollution problems. 67 Prior to the federal gov-
60. See id. at 1176 ("Preemption of state law has been employed sparingly in
federal environmental laws. It usually is reserved for regulation of products that
are distributed nationally.").
61. Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 1-311, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1994).
62. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act §§ 1-34, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 135-13 6y (1994).
63. Clean Air Act §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76 71q (1994).
64. Coastal Zone Management Act §§ 301-31, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1994).
65. Clean Water Act §§ 1-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
66. See Percival, supra note 46, at 1174-75. The following illustrates the coop-
erative federalism model:
The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, [the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act] and the Safe Drinking Water Act all require EPA to estab-
lish minimum national standards that can be implemented and adminis-
tered by states subject to federal supervision. These statutes generally
permit federal authority to be delegated to state officials once they
demonstrate that they are capable of operating the programs in a man-
ner that meets minimum federal requirements. In states that choose not
to apply for program delegation, the federal programs are operated and
enforced by federal authorities.
Id. at 1174.
67. See id. at 1158 (stating that "the primary targets of environmental regula-
tion [prior to 1970] were federal agencies rather than private industry"). The fed-
eral government initially became involved in environmental reform because of
inadequate judicial redress and for public policy reasons. These public policy rea-
sons included the following: (1) federal statutes are the most effective means for
overcoming states' parochialism; (2) federalization is the only means of control-
ling transboundary pollution; (3) federal control is a guarantee of a minimum
level of environmental protection across the nation; (4) federal control is an aid to
states' resistance of pressures to relax regulatory standards; and (5) federalization
is a mechanism to create economies of a scale equivalent to that of the federal
government in certain environmental regulation. See generally Percival, supra note
46; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FIucKEV, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE 76
(1991) (discussing the methods in which states compete to impose externalities on
other states); James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 449,
19981
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ernment's enactment of statutory law, a number of piecemeal
judicial decisions provided an incomplete and inadequate guide to
the resolution of conflicts involving environmental issues.
For example, in Missouri v. Illinois,68 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the right of the State of Illinois "to discharge
the sewage of Chicago through an artificial channel into the
Desplaines River, which emptied into a tributory of the Mississippi
River."'69 Because the Court found that the State of Missouri's evi-
dentiary showing unconvincing and that it had "unclean hands" in
funneling its own sewage to cities further south, it deemed the State
of Missouri undeserving of relief.70 Notably, the Court discussed
the absence of legislation addressing this specific issue 7 l and the
appropriateness of judicial interpretation of the, Constitution to re-
solve the conflict. 72 The following year, the Court in Georgia v. Ten-
451-52 (1994) (outlining various problems associated with legislative control and
regulation of pollution, particularly marketable pollution allowances under Title
IV of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990); James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uni-
form Environmental Standards in a Federal System - And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV.
1226, 1231-32 (1995) [hereinafter Krier, On the Topology] (outlining policy issues,
particularly administrative efficiency, associated with uniform environmental
standards).
68. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
69. Id. at 497. As a result of the discharging of large amounts of raw sewage,
the downstream water of St. Louis was severely contaminated with infectious mater-
ials and diseases. See id. at 498-99. In turn, the polluted water of St. Louis lead to
an "enormous increase in deaths and cases of typhoid" and was a "source of finan-
cial loss" to St. Louis. Id. at 499. Accordingly, the State of Missouri sought relief
for the discharge of raw sewage. See id. at 516-17.
70. See id. at 526. The Court found in favor of the State of Illinois. See id. To
support its contentions, the State of Illinois argued the following:
A court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain a party from
committing a nuisance when the evidence shows that the party com-
plaining is guilty of contributing to the nuisance of which it complains. If
the granting of an injunction will not relieve him from the consequences
of his own acts the injunction will not issue. If the complainant contrib-
utes to the conditions which it claims in its bill of complaint will injure it
as a State, it cannot obtain equitable relief.
It is the fundamental principle of equity that "He who seeks equity
must do equity," and out of this grows the maxim that "He who comes
into equity must come with clean hands." In other words, courts of equity
will not enjoin one from doing a lawful act upon the application of one
who, while claiming said act will cause him great and irreparable injury, is
himself contributing to the injurious condition complained of.
Id. at 515.
71. See id. at 519-20. The Court asserted that Congress had the power to deal
with this matter by enacting legislation under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 518-
19. However, the Court also stated that "whether Congress could act or not, there
is no suggestion that it has forbidden the action of Illinois." Id. at 519.
72. See id. at 520-22. Specifically, the Court stated the following:
If we suppose a case which did not fall within the power of Congress to
regulate the result of a declaration of rights by this court would be the
[Vol. IX: p. I
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nessee Copper Co. imitated, although not without reservation, the
approach it utilized in the resolution of Missouri v. Illinois.
73
Recognizing the institutional investment it would be forced to
make in case-by-case adjudication of similar transboundary dis-
putes, the Supreme Court continued, in following years, to resolve
conflicts over pollution through costly judicial decisions.74 Never-
theless, the Court did not continue to utilize the same approach
which it had applied in Missouri v. Illinois. The Court first diverged
from this approach in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,75 a 1972 case in
which the Court found the federal district court to be the appropri-
ate forum for resolution of a nuisance action brought by Illinois
against four Wisconsin cities. 76 Nine years later in City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois,77 the Supreme Court determined that federal common
law did not impose more stringent standards than those set forth
establishment of a rule which would be irrevocable by any power except
that of this court to reverse its own decision, an amendment of the Con-
stitution, or possibly an agreement between the States sanctioned by the
legislature of the United States.
Id. at 520.
73. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). Tennessee
Copper involved a dispute concerning sulfur dioxide emissions from a Tennessee
copper smelting company. See id. As a consequence of the noxious emissions,
.wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops [was] going on, and other
injuries [were] done and threatened in five counties" near the plant. Id. The
Court stated that "[t]he caution with which demands of this sort, on the part of a
State, for relief from injuries analogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon
in Missouri v. Illinois." Id. at 237. Thereafter, the Court determined that "there is
no alternative to issuing an injunction." Id. at 239.
74. See, e.g., New York v. NewJersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (holding that right
of New York to maintain such a suit on behalf of her citizens was clear, without
regard to precise location of boundary between two states or without regard to
New York's claim ofjurisdiction over waters of New York Bay); see also NewJersey v.
City of New York, 289 U.S. 712 (1933) (appointing a special master to oversee
court order); New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931) (per curiam)
(ordering enjoinment of operation and utilization of "existing incinerators and
other facilities").
75. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
76. See id. at 93, 108. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had polluted Lake
Michigan. See id. at 93. Moreover, plaintiff requested the court to abate the public
nuisance. See id. The Court responded:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in
time preempt the field of federal common law nuisance. But until that
time comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the eq-
uities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollu-
tion. While federal law governs, consideration of state standards may be
relevant.
Id. at 107. However, the Court pointed out that "[t]here are no fixed rules that
govern; these will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancel-
lor will largely govern." Id. at 107-08.
77. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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under the Clean Water Act.7 8 Thus, the Court's decision indicated
a judicial shift toward stricter adherence to authoritative federal
legislation.
In the 1990s, the inadequacy of environmental regulation has
captured national attention. For example, in 1995 Speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich referred to the federal environmental system
as "a national disgrace." 79 The creation of EPA and enactment of
the environmental statutory system was, however, as public choice
theorists indicate, a response to the desire of interest groups to
have wealth redistributed to the poor.80 Interestingly enough, envi-
ronmentalists were not a well-organized force at the federal level in
the early days of the enactment of federal environmental laws. This
lack of environmentalist presence at the federal level actually re-
sulted in the passage of more stringent federal legislation. 81
In the 1970s, industry was caught in a chain reaction. Industry
had the option to either fight against national legislation or support
a uniform federal system to offset the danger of environmentalists'
encouragement of more stringent state laws. 8 2 For example, Ralph
78. Id. at 312. The Court reasoned:
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own
rules of decision. The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national
concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is
generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from
democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected represent-
atives in Congress.
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and
when there exists a "significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law," the Court has found it necessary, in a
"few and restricted" instances, to develop federal common law. Nothing
in this process suggests that courts are better suited to develop national
policy in areas governed by federal common law than they are in other
areas, or that the usual and important concerns of an appropriate divi-
sion of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are inap-
plicable. We have always recognized that federal common law is "subject
to the paramount authority of Congress."
Id. at 312-13 (citations omitted).
79. Environmental Risks and Benefits, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at A16.
80. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 264 (1982). With reference to the public inter-
est theory, Posner asserted:
The "public interest" theory ... is well represented in the writing of such
economists as Baumol and Pigou. It conceives both the ideal and the
actual function of legislation to be to increase economic welfare by cor-
recting market failures such as crime and pollution. Some laws designed
to transfer wealth from rich to poor can be fitted into the theory.
Id. at 265.
81. See Elliot, supra note 44, at 320-21 (discussing federal legislation while en-
vironmentalists were not well-organized).
82. See id. at 320.
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Nader's criticism of Senator Muskie's "pitiful efforts" to legislate in
the area of air pollution prior to 1970 forced Senator Muskie to
support stringent federal legislation designed to protect the envi-
ronment.83 If there had been a unified presence for environmen-
talists, however, Senator Muskie may not have supported stringent
federal legislation and thereby provided the states with the oppor-
tunity to regulate. It is likely that environmentalists would have sup-
ported the enactment of stringent legislation by the states. 84
Uniform national regulatory standards exist under current en-
vironmental laws. Almost all federal environmental statutes provide
for state implementation of programs and standards no less strin-
gent than the federal standards. 85 Accordingly, states may enact
controls more stringent than those established by the federal gov-
ernment, but the environmental standards they set may not fall be-
low the floor created by the federal government.
B. Environmental Devolution
After two and one-half decades of almost unquestioned sup-
port from Congress and the public, environmental regulation faced
a fierce political backlash in the mid-1990s when regulatory reform
sought to limit the enactment of new regulations and the enforce-
ment of existing regulations. 86 Reflecting these new sentiments,
the House of Representatives passed a bill in the 104th Congress
which served to dramatically relax the requirements of the Clean
Water Act.87 An onslaught of statutory and program demands com-
bined with limitations on funds slowly drove the states into peren-
nial shortfalls. Consequently, states looked for ways to effectively
manage environmental programs. The National Association of
Public Administrators Report summarized the situation between
EPA and the states as a "system [that] is broken and must be
fixed. '88 The report concluded that it was imperative that EPA im-
83. See id. at 327.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 183(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(f) (4) (1994); Clean
Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act § 9004(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(b) (1) (1994).
86. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 112 (2d ed. 1996).
87. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-2567 (1996).
88. EPA, Report of the Task Force to Enhance State Capacity-Strengthening Environ-
mental Management in the United States, Pub. No. EPA-270-R-93-001 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Task Force to Enhance State Capacity]. A report written by EPA recommended a
major new emphasis on the working relationship between EPA and the states. See
id. at 1. EPA Administrator, Carol M. Browner, wrote that "[t] he report recognizes
the interdependence between state and federal environmental programs and of-
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prove its relationship with state and local authorities, because the
bottom-line lesson is that if the states fail, EPA fails. 89
Many states authorized to manage federal environmental pro-
grams have, at times, not met the requirements necessary for the
implementation of these programs.90 The result of a state's inabil-
ity to comply with requisite standards has served as a major strain
on the relationship between EPA and the states. According to EPA
and state officials, resource limitations are the major cause of these
existing problems. Federal funding has not kept pace with new en-
vironmental requirements and states have been unable to make up
the difference. 91 From the start, states sought both federal funds to
support their environmental efforts and local control over the envi-
ronmental programs. 92 A 1995 General Accounting Office report
evidences these sentiments by concluding that eighty-five percent of
program managers surveyed wanted increased federal funding to
meet their environmental obligations. 93 The report also indicates,
however, that state government officials surveyed complained of
"micromanagement of their programs by EPA regions."94
fers a number of specific recommendations on how to succeed in carrying out
[the] shared mission." Id. The report focused on four areas: (1) improving the
relationship between the states and EPA; (2) encouraging alternative financing
mechanisms; (3) investing in state management infrastructure; and (4) streamlin-
ing the grants assistance process. See id. at 2.
89. See id. at 2.
90. See UNITED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFcE, Report to the Ranking Mi-
nority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, EPA and the States: Envi-
ronmental Challenges Require a Better Working Relationship, Pub. No. GAO/RCED-95-
64 3 (1995) [hereinafter GAO Report]. According to a 1995 General Accounting
Office report, "[m ] any states have had difficulty performing key functions, such as
monitoring environmental quality, setting standards, issuing permits, and enforc-
ing compliance. Consequently, states have become increasingly reluctant to ac-
cept the additional responsibilities associated with recent environmental laws." Id.
91. See id. States have often been unable to provide the necessary funding
"because EPA has sometimes required states to apply scarce resources to national
priorities at the expense of some of their own environmental concerns." Id.
92. See id. at 5-6.
93. See id. at 5.
94. Id. at 5. The Executive Summary of a 1995 General Accounting Office
report stated, in relevant part:
Although some states noted improvement in the area, 63 percent of the
state managers responding to GAO's questionnaire still found EPA's con-
trols excessive. EPA countered - with some justification, according to
past GAO reviews - that basic problems with state programs sometimes
warrant close oversight. Despite these differences, however, state and
EPA officials contacted by GAO agree that EPA should focus on provid-
ing the states with technical assistance, clarifying regulations, performing
the technical research needed to support state environmental regula-
tions, and giving states the flexibility to achieve environmental results
from their programs without prescribing the precise steps they must take
to achieve them.
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IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP
SYSTEM
NEPPS is an attempt by EPA and the states to alter their tradi-
tional statutory and regulatory relationship. Under the traditional
system, statutes provide legislative authority for environmental pro-
tection measures, appropriation bills provide funding and regula-
tions outline fundamental procedures. 95 As an alternative, and to
provide a new framework for relations between EPA and the states,
NEPPS encourages "shared responsibility for success."9 6
Id.
95. See Creation of Partnership System, supra note 5, at 1. The State/EPA Capac-
ity Steering Committee, a committee established to assist in the implementation of
NEPPS, stated that EPA must direct scarce public resources toward improving envi-
ronmental results, allow states greater flexibility to achieve those results and en-
hance EPA's accountability to the public and taxpayers. See generally Creation of
Partnership System, supra note 5. The State/EPA Capacity Steering Committee set
forth the following principles to provide guidance for the implementation of
NEPPS:
1. Continuous environmental improvements are desirable and achieva-
ble throughout the country.
2. A core level of environmental protection must be maintained for all
citizens.
3. National environmental progress should be reported using indicators
that are reflective of environmental conditions, trends, and results.
4. Joint USEPA/State planning should be based on environmental goals
that are adaptable to local conditions while respecting the need for a
"level playing field" across the country.
5. USEPA/State activity plans and commitments should allocate federal
and state resources to the highest priority problems across all media, and
should seek pollution-prevention approaches before management, treat-
ment, disposal, and cleanup.
6. The new approach to the USEPA/State relationship should facilitate
and encourage public understanding of environmental conditions and
government activities.
7. A different approach to oversight should provide an incentive for State
programs to perform well, rewarding strong state programs and freeing
up federal resources to address problems where state programs need
assistance.
Id.
96. See Letter from Fred Hanson, supra note 4, at 1. Prior to NEPPS, the fed-
eral government's funding of state programs was based on federal initiatives legis-
lated by Congress, and success was measured by counting the number of
enforcement actions taken, inspections conducted and permits issued. See id.
Now, under the new system, individual NEPPS agreements between states and EPA
define appropriate oversight. See id. Under the agreements, program elements
change, self-assessment supplants bureaucratic oversight of statutory programs by
EPA, technology is maximally employed to monitor and report compliance, and
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NEPPS prompts states to develop individual assessments of
goals and strategies as well as to negotiate a "contract for services"
with EPA.97 Fred Hansen, EPA Deputy Administrator, refers to
such contracts as central to... reinvention efforts."98 EPA Admin-
istrator, Carol Browner, similarly describes NEPPS as "more pro-
gressive beyond the current system which relies on numbers of
permits, inspections made or other similar quantitative methods."99
However, the need to maintain a core level of environmental pro-
tection consistently in all states raises questions. In particular,
NEPPS does not provide clear answers for all the issues. For exam-
ple, NEPPS does not provide an assessment of environmental pro-
tection and insurance that a core level will continue to exist.
Additionally, NEPPS does not guarantee that the concept of a "level
playing field" will be respected and maintained under a system of
individual contracts between EPA and the states in the absence of
assessment standards.
A. Background on National Environmental Performance
Partnerships
In 1993, EPA and the states created the State/EPA Capacity
Task Force to develop a fundamental framework for improving
their relationship. 100 EPA and the states agreed in a 1993 task force
report to shift responsibility for implementing and enforcing feder-
ally mandated environmental programs to the states. 10 1 On March
97. See id.
98. Memorandum from Fred Hansen, EPA Deputy Administrator, to Senior
State Environmental Protection Officials 1 (July 15, 1996) (on file with author).
The Deputy Administrator stated, in relevant part:
The new system recognizes the vital role the States play in environmental
protection and provides the flexibility States need to design strategies
that meet their own conditions and needs. With a focus on results, per-
formance partnerships direct resources where they are most needed and
facilitate implementation of common sense, multi-media approaches to
public health protection and environmental problem-solving. The States
and Regions pioneering this new approach are already beginning to see
these benefits. Their experiences reinforce our commitment to put the
concept of performance partnerships into practice across the nation.
Id.
99. Creation of Partnership System, supra note 5, at 2.
100. See GAO Report, supra note 90, at 15. A 1995 General Accounting Office
report noted that the United States General Accounting Office conducted its
"work between February 1993 and February 1995 in accordance with generally ac-
cepted government auditing standards." Id.
101. See generally Task Force to Enhance State Capacity, supra note 88. "By the
mid-1980's, states had assumed primary responsibility for day-to-day operations of
many environmental programs, under authority delegated from EPA." Id. at 9.
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3, 1995, as part of his "Reinventing Government" effort, President
Clinton announced the creation of NEPPS. 10 2
In May 1995, EPA and the states signed an agreement entitled
the Joint Commitments to Reform Oversight and Create a National
Environmental Performance Partnership System.103 Although un-
heralded by most individuals in the environmental field, the under-
lying basis of a NEPPS agreement is a set of environmental goals
that adapt to local conditions and aspire to be respectful of the
need for a "level playing field" across the country. 10 4 NEPPS en-
ables state development of agreements with EPA based on a particu-
lar state's respective needs and capacities.10 5 Its goal is to shift from
control of separate media (air, water, waste) and priority-setting to
overall planning for the states' environments. 10 6 By focusing on en-
vironmental improvement and community-based environmental
protection, NEPPS aims to ensure progress in pursuit of environ-
mental goals, establish partnerships between states and regional
EPA offices, and foster the transition to greater state autonomy.
Under the traditional system, EPA performed its mandatory
statutory mission with accountability to Congress and the public.
NEPPS, however encourages the success of state programs through
EPA's "differential oversight" of state action.10 7 Under NEPPS,
102. For a discussion of President Clinton's role in the general trend toward
devolution, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
103. See generally Creation of Partnership System, supra note 5. Emphasizing the
need for its implementation, the parties to NEPPS commented that "[w]e are in
the midst of a critical transitional period for our nation's environmental policy.
We have accomplished much in 25 years to protect the health of our people and
preserve natural treasures for future generations. But much remains to be done."
Id.
104. See id. at 1. The purpose of NEPPS is described as follows:
States and [EPA] propose a new environmental partnership that will en-
courage continuous improvement and foster excellence in state and fed-
eral environmental programs. This new approach will reflect the
advances made in environmental protection in the United States over the
past two decades and recognize that existing policies and management
approaches must be modified to ensure continued environmental pro-
gress. We must direct scarce public resources toward improving environ-
mental results, allow states greater flexibility to achieve those results, and
account our accountability to the public and taxpayers.
Id.
105. See id. at 2-3.
106. See id. at 3.
107. See id. at 5-6. NEPPS describes the "differential oversight" approach in
the following manner:
EPA will work with all states using the new environmental performance
partnership system and reaching agreements on environmental perform-
ance based on an up-front assessment of environmental conditions in
each state. After agreement is reached, EPA will focus on program-wide,
limited after-the-fact reviews rather than case-by-case intervention and will
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although jointly accountable with EPA to Congress and the public
for implementing environmental programs and initiatives, the
states are primarily responsible for environmental management. 10 8
The performance of the states under NEPPS is assessed on the
basis of "environmental indicators," the purpose of which are to fa-
cilitate the detection of trends or phenomena that are not readily
detectable.10 9 These measures of condition, action, or progress to-
ward goals or objectives are intended to show environmental trends
as well as reflect changes in human welfare caused by varying envi-
ronmental conditions including stress and management re-
sponses.110 Based on raw data and instrument measurements,
environmental indicators include, but are not limited to: (1) the
percentage of a state's landfills equipped with engineered liner sys-
tems; (2) the percentage of a state's fish that is safe to eat; and (3)
improvements in a state's air quality. 1 ' While laudatory in its
objectives, environmental indicators have some intrinsic problems,
as does NEPPS, as a whole.
work with states to identify other ways to reduce oversight. Using differ-
ential oversight will serve as an incentive for strong state performance
and enable EPA to focus resources on state programs that need more
assistance to perform well.
Id.
108. See Creation of Partnership System, supra note 5, at 5-6. NEPPS provides for
the following:
The states should serve as the primary front-line delivery agent, managing
their own programs, adapting to local conditions, and testing new ap-
proaches for delivering more environmental protection for less. Among
its other responsibilities, such as ensuring good science and strong na-
tional health and environmental standards, the federal government
should provide analysis of environmental and compliance trends, provide
expertise to and facilitate learning among the states, work in a collabora-
tive and more flexible partnership with the states, address interstate is-
sues, and serve as a backstop, ensuring that all states provide fundamental public
health and environmental protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
109. See GAO Report, supra note 90, at 44-45 ("Environmental indicators are
direct measures of the health of the environment, such as the numbers and health
of specific, key flora and fauna in an ecosystem. Theoretically, these indicators can
show the condition of the environment at a given point in time - a 'snapshot' of
environmental quality.").
110. See id. at 44. A 1995 General Accounting Office report provides, in perti-
nent part:
[W]hen measured over time, [environmental indicators] may be able to
show trends in the condition of the environment, thus enabling EPA and
the states to (1) pinpoint polluted areas or areas at risk from pollution so
that efforts can be made to identify and control the source(s) of the pol-
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B. Problems with NEPPS
The most fundamental weakness of NEPPS agreements is that
the statutory authority to implement and enforce the individual me-
dia programs is governed by delegation. 1 2 The statutory delega-
tion language contained in various environmental statutes has
made it increasingly difficult for Congress in the past several ses-
sions to reauthorize major bills.1 1 3 Yet, without statutory changes,
some of the contemplated NEPPS agreements could threaten dele-
gation in particular states.
Another potential problem for the states and EPA operating
under NEPPS is the questionable ability of the states to continue to
satisfy the statutory and regulatory mandates set forth in other envi-
ronmental statutes and in the Code of Federal Regulations. 1 4 Spe-
cific provisions of the Omnibus Appropriations and Rescissions Act,
however, provide NEPPS with basic funds and continuing appropri-
ations." 5 It is important to realize that these provisions of the Om-
nibus Appropriations and Rescissions Act do not negate the specific
mandates or grant language of other statutes, such as the Clean
Water Act, which provides specific guidelines as to how states
should spend the grant money.1 16
112. See id. Under statutory authority, EPA may delegate certain federal pow-
ers to the states. See id. The federal government provides funding for states' pro-
grams on the condition that the states provide EPA with documentation assuring
that appropriate standards for compliance and enforcement are being met. See id.
For a further discussion of the interrelationship between the federal government
and the states, see supra notes 15-43 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of the federal government's historical involvement in
the development of environmental legislation, see supra notes 44-65 and accompa-
nying text.
114. For a discussion of the difficulties which have historically surrounded
reconciliation of federal and state legislation, see supra notes 15-22 and accompa-
nying text.
115. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
116. See Clean Water Act § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). The Clean Water
Act provides, in pertinent part:
For each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1987, the Administra-
tor may give priority in making grants under this subsection, and shall
give consideration in determining the Federal share of any such grant, to
States which have implemented or are proposing to implement manage-
ment programs which will-
(A) control particularly difficult or serious nonpoint source pollu-
tion problems, including, but not limited to, problems resulting from
mining activities;
(B) implement innovative methods or practices for controlling
nonpoint sources of pollution, including regulatory programs where the
Administrator deems appropriate;
(C) control interstate nonpoint source pollution problems; or
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According to a 1995 task force report, implementation of
NEPPS would require exceptions to the regulations governing fed-
eral-state grants for environmental programs.' 17 Title 40, Part 31 of
the Code of Federal Regulations requires that the money awarded
by the federal government be accounted for in a very precise man-
ner. Such measures are the equivalent of notice and comment,
which are two due process requirements that the federal govern-
ment cannot eliminate.118 EPA has initiated rule making to revise
the regulations, but until that process is complete, EPA is bound to
abide by the regulations already in place. The scheme of NEPPS
attempts to avoid basic funding decisions and program oversight by
specific media, and instead provide block grant funding to the
(D) carry out ground water quality protection activities which the
Administrator determines are part of a comprehensive nonpoint source
pollution control program, including research, planning ground water
assessments, demonstration programs, enforcement, technical assistance,
education, and training to protect ground water from nonpoint sources
of pollution.
Id. § 319(h) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (5).
117. See Uniform Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to
State and Local Governments, 40 C.F.R. § 31 (1997). The purpose and scope of
these requirements is to establish "uniform administrative rules for federal grants
and cooperative agreements and sub-awards to state, local and Indian tribal gov-
ernments." Id. § 31.1.
118. See Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). The Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act describes the notice and comment procedure as
follows:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either
personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance
with law....
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis-
sion of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general state-
ment of their basis and purpose.
Id. § 553 (b)-(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). Changing NEPPS without either statutory
or regulatory changes may run afoul of the traditional due process requirements of
public notice and opportunity to comment. See Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F.
Supp. 904, 912 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding Environmental Impact Statements
prepared by Navy and Army Corps of Engineers were inadequate to permit in-
formed decision making and informed public participation). The Fiends of the
Earth court stated that "[wlhere a detailed Environmental Impact Statement fails
to contain a detailed mitigation plan, the agency fails to meet its touchstone obli-
gation of fostering informed decision making and informed public participation."
Id. at 939; see also Deficit Reduction Act § 20(b), 41 U.S.C. § 418(b) (1994) (pro-
viding specifically for notice and comment processes for amendment or modifica-
tions relating to expenditure of appropriated federal funds).
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states, which departs from the requirements of the regulations. 119
Although block grant funding is an appropriate and defensible
course to follow, EPA needs to first change the regulations through
notice and comment. While EPA has taken steps to alter rule mak-
ing procedures, these efforts may prove futile, however, if devolu-
tion of power to the states moves too quickly to await EPA's
predicted 1998 completion of its regulatory alterations. 120
A separate problem is that grant agreements from prior years
may require on-going contractual activities. As with most govern-
mental activities, there are no uniform starting and stopping dates
for environmental grant projects. 121 Thus, some grants funded
prior to NEPPS will require on-going funding, even after NEPPS is
in place. For example, NEPPS does not cover the Clean Air Act
Inspection and Maintenance Program, 122 the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act,123 the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants under the Clean Air Act,124 or the Clean
Air Act Title V125 programs run by states.
An additional problem with NEPPS is that it does not discuss
national uniformity, a longtime goal of environmental protection
efforts.126 Because each state establishes priorities with the appro-
priate EPA regional office under NEPPS, those priorities may vary
considerably across the nation. Similarly, EPA's decreased over-
sight of state environmental agency performance leads to the likeli-
hood that uniformity of environmental standards will decrease
119. For a discussion of NEPPS, see Performance Partnership Grants, supra note
3, at 8.
120. See Letter from Fred Hanson, EPA Deputy Administrator, to Associates 1
(July 24, 1996) (on file with author) (discussing EPA Revised Interim Guidance
report and explaining how "guidance will serve as the operating guidance for
States and Tribes interested in applying for [Performance Partnership Grants]").
121. It would be impossible to have exact dates to begin and end these
projects because it would be necessary to shut down projects totally and then begin
the new projects. As with any new system, there must be overlap time.
122. Clean Air Act § 181, 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (1994) (requiring states to imple-
ment enhanced Inspection and Maintenance Program for vehicles in severe ozone
nonattainment areas).
123. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act §§ 201-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-
54 (1994) (requiring states to implement a federally supervised program).
124. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994) (setting forth definitions
and list of hazardous air pollutants, and describing method of revising emission
standards through submission of modification petitions).
125. Clean Air Act §§ 501-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (1994) (dealing with
permits, relevant definitions, programmatic details, application processes, and
other various requirements and conditions).
126. For a discussion concerning the general goals of EPA, see EPA's Mission
(visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/epa.html> (providing
overview of EPA's history as well as details of future plans).
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through EPA's encouragement of an even lesser standard of re-
view. 127 Moreover, NEPPS's discouragement of "bean counting"
and reliance instead on "environmental indicators" is problematic
because there is neither uniform understanding of precisely what
qualifies as an "environmental indicator" 128 nor an indication of
when improvements in indicators have been achieved. Given the
vagueness of the parameters and measures of success, concerns
about EPA oversight of states' performance may increase.
The final weakness of NEPPS involves the determination as to
when enforcement authority arises in a NEPPS state. Markedly,
quantification of enforcement actions taken is no longer a critical
component under NEPPS.129 Both individual states and EPA are
publicly emphasizing compliance assistance over enforcement ac-
tions. 130 Recently, state enforcement under a "race to the bottom"
scenario has been implicated as unsound environmental protec-
tion.1 31 Citizens in Ohio, Michigan, Idaho and Texas filed petitions
requesting that EPA withdraw delegated programs in these states.132
The main contention in these states is that state regulators have
127. See Superfund Sites May Receive Less Oversight Under EPA's 'Cooperative' Ap-
proach, 34 Air/Water Pollution Report's Env't Week (Business Publishers, Inc.) No.
33, at 516 (Aug. 19, 1996) ("To qualify [for reduced federal oversight], potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) must consistently produce sound documents and per-
form well in laboratory or field audits .... A PRP also must agree to a reasonable
time frame to complete a cleanup and comply with the terms of its agreement with
EPA.").
128. See Performance Partnership Grants, supra note 3, at 5. EPA defines environ-
mental indicators as "measures of actual changes in air and water quality, land use,
and changes in living resources and human health." Id. Under section 1.7 of
EPA's report, entitled Performance Partnership Grants for State and Tribal Envi-
ronmental Programs: Interim Guidance, EPA requires that Performance Partner-
ship Grants program commitments "must be quantifiable, measurable and
verifiable." Id. Although these are vague terms, they are only intended to act as
guiding principles. See id.
129. See id. at 6 (stating that "[s]pecific performance measures are required
only if they are required by statute, regulation or standing legal agreement be-
tween EPA and States/Tribes (e.g. Delegation Agreements), or if EPA National
Program Managers or Regions have required them in guidance or policy").
130. See generally Kyle Niederpruem, Environmental Agency Picks New Commis-
sioner, INDLANAPOLIS STAR, May 22, 1996. Michael O'Connor, Commissioner, Indi-
ana Department of Environmental Management, stated that "I intend to continue
the direction we've been taking toward compliance-driven activities, helping peo-
ple to understand what they have to do to come into compliance." Id.
131. See Krier, On the Topology, supra note 67, at 1236-37.
132. SeeJohn H. Cushman, Jr., Colorado and Ohio Accused of Skirting Federal En-
vironmental Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at BI (explaining that "these petitions,
filed with the Environmental Protection Agency, could strengthen the Federal
Agency's hand in a long-running dispute between Washington and the states over
how far to go in protecting compliance where states voluntarily audit and correct
their own pollution problems").
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initiated few or no enforcement actions in recent years. The ques-
tion remains whether state enforcement will deteriorate without the
presence of a strong federal back-up.
V. CONCLUSION
Public choice theory discredits major public policy issues on
economic terms, frequently concluding that self-interest and self-
preservation are motivators for legislators, lobbyists and bureau-
crats.13 3 Likewise, it suggests that legislatures pass laws and adminis-
trative agencies promulgate rules that result from compromises
involving public interest groups who would benefit from them.13 4
Public choice groups seeking higher levels of environmental quality
are more effective at the federal level than at the state or local
levels. 135
The lack of compromise under NEPPS caused by the non-in-
volvement of the legislative process may ultimately invalidate the
entire program. Although its ends of flexibility and decreased bu-
reaucracy are laudable, regulators need to structure NEPPS
through federal and state legislatures to ensure that procedures are
followed and that room is made for the participation of elected offi-
cials, citizens and interest groups. Congress needs to either set or
delegate the priorities of states that have not yet contracted with
EPA.
Like all proposed devolutions, NEPPS will change the status
quo. As such, the consequences to conflicting interest groups are
relevant. The NEPPS process of shifting power from the federal
government to states is occurring at a level where only organized
interest groups can have enormous influence. Individual citizens,
however, are not provided access to this process. Although citizen
environmentalists are not effective at the federal level, they have a
strong federal presence. Moreover, regulated industry may ulti-
mately prosper from a new-found ability to play states against one
another as a result of authority being set at the state level.
While it is far too early to determine whether the 1990s "states'
rights" movement represents a historic development within our na-
tion's expanding and contracting interpretations of federalism, its
133. For a complete analysis of public policy issues as seen through public
choice theory, see supra notes 112-32 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of models of environmental regulation supported by
both federal and state legislatures, see supra notes 44-65.
135. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Shroeder, EPA and the Courts:
Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 249, 308-09 (1991)
(presenting history of EPA by discussing significant court cases).
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expression in environmental protection should trouble us all.
NEPPS appears to fit the present times and is consistent with the
"back to the states" movements. However, there are significant
legal and public policy problems in such an abrupt shift of author-
ity. NEPPS suggests that unelected officials at the federal and state
levels can alter their relationship through a contract, while the rest
of us, regardless of our interest, will neither know of nor influence
the change. This new relationship may lack the validity that even
cynical public choice theorists ascribe to models that operate within
an acknowledged interest group framework. NEPPS lacks proce-
dural validity and may be doomed to failure despite the legislature's
good intentions of "returning power to the states" and infusing flex-
ibility into an admittedly rigid federalized system.
Because NEPPS has begun and more states are signing on, the
best hope for correction lies within the federal courts. The judicial
system can evaluate NEPPS by a standard of "due process of law
making" and invalidate the program on the grounds of its inherent
legislative quality. Finding current NEPPS devolution in violation
of "due process of lawmaking" would make no statement about the
value of its goals, but would require the correct implementation of
those goals in accordance with due process.
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